A History Lesson.

I realise that most of my blogs have been self centred lately, so I wanted to share a bit about the modern history of Korea and causes for the North/South divide that are still causing major problems to this day. I wrote this essay while I was at Washington University in St Louis, in October 2005. So it might not be my best work but I was pretty proud of it at the time! Feel free to wait until I have returned to my ranting and moaning if you can't stomach the essay, I won't mind!


“Identify and evaluate the Cold War in Korea from 1950-3.”

The Korean War of 1950 to 1953 served to both intensify and militarise the Cold War. Events following the Second World War and the collapse of the Japanese empire placed Korea at the behest of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the attack on South Korea on 25 June 1950 was undertaken by Kim Il Sung and his North Korean troops, the approval of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin was required and served to determine when the invasion occurred. The war was initiated in an attempt to re-unite Korea, a desire shared by the Soviet supported Kim Il Sung and the American sponsored Syngman Rhee. However the involvement of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China on the side of the communist North Koreans, and the United States and United Nations in support of South Korea determined the outcome of the conflict and placed the issue of Korea firmly within the broader Cold War and sphere of influence ideology. Following the armistice in 1953 Korea remained divided, the Sino-Soviet alliance was seemingly stronger, and the United States had “contained” Communism and secured both a more integrated North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and a prosperous Japan. The Korean War served to globalise the Cold War, yet at the same time demonstrated the lengths at which the two superpowers would go in order to avoid a broader conflict with each other.
The origins of the Korean War stemmed from the division of the peninsula in 1945. Korea had been subjugated by the Japanese for nearly two generations and consequently had neither a representative national government nor its own armed forces. As historian William Stueck has argued, the “thirty-eighth parallel was a line on a map, nothing more.”[1] The agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States to divide Korea along the parallel was based on troop locations and a belief that in the longer term a reunification would occur. Ultimately Cold War ideology resulted in the instalment of two governments that would prevent this from occurring. In North Korea Communist Kim Il Sung was placed in charge by the Soviets, and in South Korea an extreme right wing, authoritarian government under Syngman Rhee was “elected” and backed by the United States. Both leaders were fervently nationalistic and desirous of a unified Korea under their control, but both were economically and militarily reliant on their occupier. North Korea, for example, had lost its two major trading partners with the collapse of the Japanese empire and with China embroiled in Civil War.[2] Thus Kim was completely reliant on trade with the Soviet Union. The United States policy makers feared a united Korea would become Communist which would have had severe implications for the rest of Asia, in particular Japan.
A range of events, each of which demonstrates the international scope of the Korean War, influenced the actual invasion itself. In Moscow on 7 March 1949 Kim requested Stalin’s permission to attack the South for the first time, Stalin refused and told Kim to be patient.[3] The significance of this event was twofold. Firstly, it illustrated Kim’s reliance on the Soviet Union for both approval and military assistance as a result of North Korean weakness. Secondly, Stalin’s refusal stemmed from the wider situation in March 1949. At this time, United States troops were still located in South Korea, thus they posed a threat to any action taken by the North. The Chinese Civil War was ongoing, and as such Stalin would have had to commit troops himself. Finally, in 1949 the focus of the Cold War was largely on Europe, notably with the question of Germany. Stalin’s ultimate commitment to the Korean War was a result of a number of interrelated factors. While a desire to solidify his power in the Soviet sphere of influence was crucial, Stalin was undoubtedly influenced by the terms of the Soviet-Sino Friendship Treaty of February 1950. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai had negotiated a clause that “Soviet troops [would] be withdrawn from Port Arthur.”[4] The loss of warm water port with access to the Pacific Ocean would have intensified Stalin’s desire for a communist Korea in order to enable easy access to the Pacific.
For the United States, the shift towards Asia followed the so-called “loss” of China in October 1949. The threat of communism spreading throughout Asia understandably seemed more immediate, especially as the Soviets had tested their first atomic bomb in August 1949. January 1950 saw Secretary of State Dean Acheson identify an American “defense perimeter” in Asia which ran from “Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands.”[5] This perimeter directly excluded Taiwan and South Korea and some historians have argued that this omission emboldened the North Koreans and reassured Stalin that Kim could be successful. This factor, alongside Mao Zedong’s commitment of Chinese Communist military aid following the Communist victory, saw Kim receive the green light from the Soviet Union to launch an attack on South Korea.
The United States was not willing to abandon South Korea to a communist takeover. Although Acheson had stated that if a country came under attack “the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it,” the American response was almost immediate.[6] The belief that the offensive was led by the Soviet Union gave President Harry Truman a sense that he had to act. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) issued memorandums following the North Korean offensive that explain the rapid response undertaken by the Americans. Intelligence Memorandum number 302 of the 8th July 1950 laid out possible scenarios and the predicted subsequent Soviet response.[7] Notably, there was a fear that the Soviet Union could prolong and overstretch American involvement in Korea while opening further incidents in “Formosa, Indochina, Burma, Iran, Yugoslavia, and Greece.”[8] Nevertheless the CIA concluded that a failure to act would mean “foreign policy and military capabilities would be discredited at home and abroad.”[9] Despite the fears of a wider global conflict, the United States committed itself to protecting South Korea in order to both contain communism and to demonstrate to the Soviets as well as America’s allies that they were willing to use force to do so.
Two equally significant factors also need to be taken into consideration. Firstly, there was the issue of Japan, where the United States had assumed the expensive responsibility of maintaining the former imperial power. Policy makers felt there was a need to sustain South Korea as a trading partner of Japan in order to prevent Japan from becoming communist as a result of limited options. In addition, the Korean War served as a massive stimulus to the Japanese economy. The conflict itself pumped $3.5 billion into Japan as a result of a program known as “special procurements,” whereby the armed forces brought their supplies in Japan.[10] This not only relieved the economic burden on the United States but also tied the two countries together in containing Soviet and Chinese expansion. Secondly, the involvement of American troops in the Korean War enabled President Truman to implement the recommendations that were outlined in the NSC-68. Consequently the Korean War oversaw a massive increase in military spending on the United States armed forces and a deeper commitment to enhance American presence in both East Asia and West Europe.
The Soviet Union boycotted the United Nations for its refusal to recognise the People’s Republic of China. The absence of a Soviet veto meant that the United States was able to wage war under the United Nations flag. This was beneficial for one key reason. If the other nations had refused to fight alongside the United States, Stalin would have been presented with a situation he could exploit to his advantage and may have been encouraged to expand into other places.[11] While the United States was in alliance with the United Nations, Stalin had an ally in the People’s Republic of China following the Communist victory under Mao Zedong. In October 1950 Mao sent over half a million Chinese Communist Party “volunteers” over the Yalu River to fight alongside the Korean troops. As historian Chen Jian illustrated Mao believed
Communist China’s security interests would be best served by guaranteeing the safety of the Chinese-Korean border [and] enhancing the CCP’s authority and credibility at home, and…on the international scene.[12]
The Soviet Union did not commit ground troops in the Korean conflict because Stalin feared the eruption of another world war. In light of Soviet inferiority in numbers of atomic weapons and inability to deploy them, this was something Stalin sought to avoid. While Mao had justification in his own mind for fighting against “such aggressive acts of American imperialism,” the pressure Stalin placed on him was crucial in determining Chinese involvement.[13]
With regards to the conflict itself, the Korean War illustrated the restraint of the two superpowers in the attempts to avoid escalation into a wider war. Despite the Soviets refusal to commit ground troops, Stalin did send in Soviet pilots and planes, albeit disguised as Chinese fighters. United States intelligence was well aware of this fact and in 1992 Paul Nitze contended the reason why it was not made public knowledge was to prevent the escalation of the conflict: “the last thing we wanted was the war to spread to a more serious confrontation with the Soviets.”[14] American atomic diplomacy in the Korean War can be seen as symbolic of future developments in the Cold War. As has already been mentioned, the Soviets had successfully tested their first atomic bomb prior to the North Korean invasion. Yet on 30 November 1950 at a press conference President Truman made it clear that the use of atomic weapons had not been ruled out.[15] This was an attempt to prevent further offensive action by the Communists and implied that the United States knew that it had superior resources at that stage. It also illustrated the feeling of insecurity the United States felt in relation to huge Soviet and Chinese armies.
The impact of the Korean War on Korea itself can still be seen today as the North and South, communist and capitalist, divide remains in effect. In the immediate sense, over ten percent of the population of Korea as a whole was killed, wounded or missing as a result of the war and the physical destruction was astronomical both to industry and agriculture.[16] The eventual development of democratic institutions in South Korea and the economic boom that occurred served as an example of Western superiority, yet this was largely dependent on a constant American influence and presence. In North Korea the economy worsened as communism collapsed in the Soviet Union, and appalling human rights abuses characterised both the aftermath of the war and the present situation. In many respects Korea was the biggest loser of the Korean War as the impact of Cold War dictated the future of the peninsula following World War Two and ultimately prevented the unification of the country.
The Soviet Union both benefited and suffered from the Korean War and its outcome. While Stalin was reassured by Mao’s loyalty and the Soviet’s overall superiority in the Soviet-Sino alliance, the Korean War had both intensified and militarised the Cold War. North Korea remained communist, however in order to ensure this Stalin had to spend hundreds of million of dollars in both economic and military assistance to China and North Korea and had ultimately provoked a “greatly intensified arms race with the Americans.”[17]
The United States did not emerge as a clear victor either. While the policy of “containment” had proved effective, the United States found itself committed to the Cold War on a global scale. The statement made by Truman declaring the United States involvement in the Korean War was indicative of this, Truman stated: “I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack upon Formosa.”[18] This development was particularly detrimental to Mao’s China as he was forced to forego any attempts to destroy Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist opposition on the island of Taiwan. Additionally, the United States had been unable to unite Korea, and had been forced to retreat by communist forces after the United Nation forces crossed the 38th parallel. With regards to combatants, the Korean War served to strengthen alliances on either side, i.e. the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China, as well as the United States and NATO. Ultimately however, the Korean War served to further polarise the two superpowers and their respective spheres of influence, thus widening the Cold War.

[1] W. Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History, (Princeton University Press: Princeton), 2002, p. 12.
[2] Ibid, p. 71.
[3] Ibid, p. 70.
[4] E. H. Judge & J. W. Langdon, The Cold War History: A History Through Documents, (Prentice Hall: New Jersey), 199, p. 58.
[5] Ibid, p. 64.
[6] Ibid, p. 64.
[7] www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/05documents/cia/ accessed 10/27/05.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] M. Walker, The Cold War: A History, (Henry Holt & co.: New York), 1994, pp. 78-9.
[11] S. H. Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the origins of the Cold War in Asia 1949-1954, (McGill-Queens University Press: Montreal), 1995, p. 77.
[12] C. Jian, Mao’s China & The Cold War, (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill), 2001, pp. 88-9.
[13] W. Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, pp.104-5.
[14] M. Walker, The Cold War, pp. 76-77.
[15] W. Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, p.117.
[16] Ibid, p. 1.
[17] W. Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, p.180.
[18] E. H. Judge & J. W. Langdon, The Cold War History, p. 70.