Not the 10 O'Clock News.

I had all these good intentions towards my blog, yet for some reason I never manage to fulfil them. I was going to follow up my history lesson with more current news concerning South Korea, but somehow August has disappeared and the four month mark is upon me. My lack of time for the blog perhaps demonstrates that I am too busy living life to document it, which can’t be a bad thing. Yet, as well as providing some entertainment for both of my readers, I wanted to look back in years to come and think to myself did this whole crazy adventure really happen. So first, stuff my children will learn about when I make them study history. Three of the most influential factors on the Republic of Korea from the twentieth century are still making an impact-the United States, the Cold War North-South divide, and Anti-Japanese sentiments (picture below of Seodaemun Prison-a site used as a tribute to those who fought against the Japanese occupation of Korea.)

May-June 2008: Don’t have a cow man! Anti-American or Anti-government?

In April, President Lee Myung-Bak (inaugurated February 2008 following a landslide victory) relaxed restrictions on the import of US beef. The restrictions that had been put in place in 2003 after a case of BSE was discovered in the United States. This decision sparked massive public protests in Seoul, largely in the form of peaceful candlelit vigils, though there were some violent clashes. There were calls for President Lee's impeachment, with his approval rating falling below 20%. However, the outcome is that American beef is being imported into South Korea and Lee is still in charge. The protests did however result in Lee removing three of his crony cabinet members.

The fear of mad cow disease was galvanised by the media. The Korean channel MBC stirred fears with a program called “PD Notebook” which exaggerated the extent of BSE and claimed that Koreans are more susceptible to BSE than other ethnic groups?! After increasing the number of protesters and protests the channel was made to issue a formal apology. (In the words of One Republic-“It’s too late to apologize.”) On the internet there were stories that cheap US beef was destined for schoolchildren or that people could die by tasting just 3 grams of older US beef. Which shows you shouldn’t always believe what you read! In addition, there was the argument that an increase in imports from the US will be detrimental to local Korean farmers-since American beef is a fraction of the price of Korean beef.

As with all protests, there were factions within the protesters although all marched under the umbrella of health concerns. Some saw the deal as a humiliating concession to the US government for a country that is trying to get out of the shadows of its Cold War protector. The protests were used as a show of discontent towards Lee’s administration. Lee was seen to be playing with South Korea’s political sovereignty while compromising public health standards. With his numerous controversial policies, including a canal to run the length of the country, it’s not surprising that the self-proclaimed “CEO of Korea” is attracting protests. One protester asked “Are we his employees?” Since South Korea only became a democracy in the late 1980s it’s understandable that there is apprehension towards a President appointing his business friends to cabinet positions and making decisions without the knowledge of the general population. Yet it’s interesting that the protesters used such an anti-American issue to highlight their discontent.

11 July 2008: North-South divide. South Korean tourist shot by North Korean soldier.

53 year old South Korean woman Park Wang-Ja was shot twice in the back at the Mt. Geumgang Special Tourist Zone after apparently crossing into a military restricted area. North Korea reported that she was deep into the military restricted area, had failed to heed warnings and was shot as she attempted to flee the scene. An investigation by a South Korean forensic team indicates that she was standing still or moving slowly when she was shot, and the area she was in wasn’t clearly defined as being “out of bounds.” Furthermore, at the distance from which she was shot it would have been apparent that she was an unarmed woman. The South Korean tour providers Hyundai Asan are being held accountable for the lack of clear warning signs, yet North Korea have as yet been very obstructive in allowing South Korea information surrounding Park’s death.

The border between the North and South (the Demilitarised Zone or DMZ) is heavily bordered and patrolled by both sides. Since 1998 South Korean tourists have been able to visit Mt. Geumgang in North Korea, which is highly regarded as an area of scenic beauty. The tourist region is a way for North Korea to receive hard currency (i.e. $$$$$) and was seen as the beginning of improved inter-Korea relations. Since the shooting, South Korea has halted all tours to the zone and North Korea has expelled many South Korean workers from the resort.

President Lee had been criticised for his aggressive stance towards North Korea since assuming office. Lee shifted tactics from his predecessors “Sunshine Policy” which sought peaceful cooperation with North Korea. Instead he promised to provide massive economic assistance but only after North Korea abandoned its nuclear weapons programs. The North Korean government viewed this as confrontational and responded by calling Lee a “traitor” and an “anti-North confrontation advocator”, which has a good ring to it! The North Korean response included the expulsion of South Korean officials from an inter-Korean industrial complex, the launching of naval missiles into the sea, and the deployment of MIGs and army units provocatively close to the DMZ. Domestically, Lee's critics claimed his strategy would only serve to antagonize the Kim Jong-Il regime and undermined progress towards friendly North Korea-South Korea relations. Yet, in Lee’s defense, his country didn’t shoot an unarmed, 53 year old woman in the back and fail to issue any form of legitimate explanation or apology.

Following North Korea’s sketchy declaration of it’s nuclear programmes and in keeping with his pro-American stance, Lee performed a u-turn in his policies and softened his stance towards the secretive regime. In a speech made following the news of Park’s death, Lee declared that humanitarian aid should be restored without precondition. Also that relations between the Korea’s should “transcend changeovers in administrations.” (The Economist, “Change of heart,” 17th July 2008). The North Korean regime, on the other hand, has refused to apologise for the shooting and believes that the South should apologise for halting tours to Mt. Geumgang.

Despite Lee’s change of heart, relations between the North and South have continued to deteriorate rapidly. According to the Economist (“Shall we do Lunch?” 7 August 2008) “South Korean security officials say that, for the first time in years, the two sides are not talking to each other even informally. The phone in Pyongyang has gone dead.” It’s looking extremely unikely that the shooting of Park Wang-ja will be explained, and that the two nations will ease relations any time soon.

July 2008: Dokdo or Takeshima? A territorial dispute over a bunch of rocks. Good times.

Two main islets in the Sea of Japan/East Sea, a bunch of smaller rocks, two permanent Korean residents, rich fishing grounds and the potential for large gas desposits, Japanese condom adverts banned from Korea’s underground network, and South Korean nationalistic pride. Dokdo/Takeshima in a nutshell.

Soveriegnty over the islets has been contested between South Korea (who call the islets Dokdo) and Japan (Takeshima) since 1905, when the Japanese seized the islands from South Korea (according to South Korea who insist Dokdo has been part of it’s territory since the 6th Century). Japan also claim ownership over the rocks since the 17th Century. Following the Second World War, South Korea was given sovereignty, but more recently the rocks have become a bone of contention between the former coloniser (Japan) and the colonised (South Korea). Until I came to Korea and experienced some of the museums here, I had no real understanding of how much the colonisation of Korea was seen as an “unbearable humiliation.”

The latest dispute was flared in July, after there were fresh claims to Japanese ownership in a book for Japanese teachers. Following these claims, nationalists in Seoul pelted the Japanese Embassy with rotten eggs and tomatoes on 17th July 2008. Matters weren’t helped when the U.S. Board of Geographic Names changed the ownership of “Dokdo” from South Korea to “Undesignated Soveriegnty.” The protests that followed saw George Bush name Dokdo as being South Korean territory.

Summary.

Regardless of who is right or wrong in the Dokdo dispute, just in my day to day living in South Korea I have probably been more aware of the Dokdo crisis than the two items reported above. With the Mad Cow Disease protests, there are signs around Hongseong which show evil cows being shipped back to America, and some restaurants proudly display signs declaring “We only serve Australian Beef.” But Dokdo tops that in two ways (three if you count the condoms!). On my flight to Thailand, Asiana Airlines (a Korean carrier) had labelled Dokdo on the flight map! Major city, major city, major city…oooh some rocks! Plus waiting at Hongseong train station for a train (luckily!) I saw a small Korean child wearing this t-shirt (See below). To be honest, he probably had no idea what it meant and since no-one outside of Korea has a clue what the whole thing is about, I found it fascinating that “Professor Snoopy” was talking about Dokdo in English! According to Jung Ha-Won, a staff reporter at Joong-ang Daily, “Dokdo is a hot commodity with enormous economic potential and strategic importance, giving each country reason to fight for it.” But surely a bit of international co-operation would save a whole lot of time and effort, and represent a step above and beyond the colonial past?

I leave you with news that an American woman had her dead pit bull successfully cloned by a company in South Korea, which shows that there are still people out there who need to watch the Lion King and be educated about the Circle of Life!

A History Lesson.

I realise that most of my blogs have been self centred lately, so I wanted to share a bit about the modern history of Korea and causes for the North/South divide that are still causing major problems to this day. I wrote this essay while I was at Washington University in St Louis, in October 2005. So it might not be my best work but I was pretty proud of it at the time! Feel free to wait until I have returned to my ranting and moaning if you can't stomach the essay, I won't mind!


“Identify and evaluate the Cold War in Korea from 1950-3.”

The Korean War of 1950 to 1953 served to both intensify and militarise the Cold War. Events following the Second World War and the collapse of the Japanese empire placed Korea at the behest of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the attack on South Korea on 25 June 1950 was undertaken by Kim Il Sung and his North Korean troops, the approval of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin was required and served to determine when the invasion occurred. The war was initiated in an attempt to re-unite Korea, a desire shared by the Soviet supported Kim Il Sung and the American sponsored Syngman Rhee. However the involvement of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China on the side of the communist North Koreans, and the United States and United Nations in support of South Korea determined the outcome of the conflict and placed the issue of Korea firmly within the broader Cold War and sphere of influence ideology. Following the armistice in 1953 Korea remained divided, the Sino-Soviet alliance was seemingly stronger, and the United States had “contained” Communism and secured both a more integrated North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and a prosperous Japan. The Korean War served to globalise the Cold War, yet at the same time demonstrated the lengths at which the two superpowers would go in order to avoid a broader conflict with each other.
The origins of the Korean War stemmed from the division of the peninsula in 1945. Korea had been subjugated by the Japanese for nearly two generations and consequently had neither a representative national government nor its own armed forces. As historian William Stueck has argued, the “thirty-eighth parallel was a line on a map, nothing more.”[1] The agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States to divide Korea along the parallel was based on troop locations and a belief that in the longer term a reunification would occur. Ultimately Cold War ideology resulted in the instalment of two governments that would prevent this from occurring. In North Korea Communist Kim Il Sung was placed in charge by the Soviets, and in South Korea an extreme right wing, authoritarian government under Syngman Rhee was “elected” and backed by the United States. Both leaders were fervently nationalistic and desirous of a unified Korea under their control, but both were economically and militarily reliant on their occupier. North Korea, for example, had lost its two major trading partners with the collapse of the Japanese empire and with China embroiled in Civil War.[2] Thus Kim was completely reliant on trade with the Soviet Union. The United States policy makers feared a united Korea would become Communist which would have had severe implications for the rest of Asia, in particular Japan.
A range of events, each of which demonstrates the international scope of the Korean War, influenced the actual invasion itself. In Moscow on 7 March 1949 Kim requested Stalin’s permission to attack the South for the first time, Stalin refused and told Kim to be patient.[3] The significance of this event was twofold. Firstly, it illustrated Kim’s reliance on the Soviet Union for both approval and military assistance as a result of North Korean weakness. Secondly, Stalin’s refusal stemmed from the wider situation in March 1949. At this time, United States troops were still located in South Korea, thus they posed a threat to any action taken by the North. The Chinese Civil War was ongoing, and as such Stalin would have had to commit troops himself. Finally, in 1949 the focus of the Cold War was largely on Europe, notably with the question of Germany. Stalin’s ultimate commitment to the Korean War was a result of a number of interrelated factors. While a desire to solidify his power in the Soviet sphere of influence was crucial, Stalin was undoubtedly influenced by the terms of the Soviet-Sino Friendship Treaty of February 1950. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai had negotiated a clause that “Soviet troops [would] be withdrawn from Port Arthur.”[4] The loss of warm water port with access to the Pacific Ocean would have intensified Stalin’s desire for a communist Korea in order to enable easy access to the Pacific.
For the United States, the shift towards Asia followed the so-called “loss” of China in October 1949. The threat of communism spreading throughout Asia understandably seemed more immediate, especially as the Soviets had tested their first atomic bomb in August 1949. January 1950 saw Secretary of State Dean Acheson identify an American “defense perimeter” in Asia which ran from “Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands.”[5] This perimeter directly excluded Taiwan and South Korea and some historians have argued that this omission emboldened the North Koreans and reassured Stalin that Kim could be successful. This factor, alongside Mao Zedong’s commitment of Chinese Communist military aid following the Communist victory, saw Kim receive the green light from the Soviet Union to launch an attack on South Korea.
The United States was not willing to abandon South Korea to a communist takeover. Although Acheson had stated that if a country came under attack “the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it,” the American response was almost immediate.[6] The belief that the offensive was led by the Soviet Union gave President Harry Truman a sense that he had to act. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) issued memorandums following the North Korean offensive that explain the rapid response undertaken by the Americans. Intelligence Memorandum number 302 of the 8th July 1950 laid out possible scenarios and the predicted subsequent Soviet response.[7] Notably, there was a fear that the Soviet Union could prolong and overstretch American involvement in Korea while opening further incidents in “Formosa, Indochina, Burma, Iran, Yugoslavia, and Greece.”[8] Nevertheless the CIA concluded that a failure to act would mean “foreign policy and military capabilities would be discredited at home and abroad.”[9] Despite the fears of a wider global conflict, the United States committed itself to protecting South Korea in order to both contain communism and to demonstrate to the Soviets as well as America’s allies that they were willing to use force to do so.
Two equally significant factors also need to be taken into consideration. Firstly, there was the issue of Japan, where the United States had assumed the expensive responsibility of maintaining the former imperial power. Policy makers felt there was a need to sustain South Korea as a trading partner of Japan in order to prevent Japan from becoming communist as a result of limited options. In addition, the Korean War served as a massive stimulus to the Japanese economy. The conflict itself pumped $3.5 billion into Japan as a result of a program known as “special procurements,” whereby the armed forces brought their supplies in Japan.[10] This not only relieved the economic burden on the United States but also tied the two countries together in containing Soviet and Chinese expansion. Secondly, the involvement of American troops in the Korean War enabled President Truman to implement the recommendations that were outlined in the NSC-68. Consequently the Korean War oversaw a massive increase in military spending on the United States armed forces and a deeper commitment to enhance American presence in both East Asia and West Europe.
The Soviet Union boycotted the United Nations for its refusal to recognise the People’s Republic of China. The absence of a Soviet veto meant that the United States was able to wage war under the United Nations flag. This was beneficial for one key reason. If the other nations had refused to fight alongside the United States, Stalin would have been presented with a situation he could exploit to his advantage and may have been encouraged to expand into other places.[11] While the United States was in alliance with the United Nations, Stalin had an ally in the People’s Republic of China following the Communist victory under Mao Zedong. In October 1950 Mao sent over half a million Chinese Communist Party “volunteers” over the Yalu River to fight alongside the Korean troops. As historian Chen Jian illustrated Mao believed
Communist China’s security interests would be best served by guaranteeing the safety of the Chinese-Korean border [and] enhancing the CCP’s authority and credibility at home, and…on the international scene.[12]
The Soviet Union did not commit ground troops in the Korean conflict because Stalin feared the eruption of another world war. In light of Soviet inferiority in numbers of atomic weapons and inability to deploy them, this was something Stalin sought to avoid. While Mao had justification in his own mind for fighting against “such aggressive acts of American imperialism,” the pressure Stalin placed on him was crucial in determining Chinese involvement.[13]
With regards to the conflict itself, the Korean War illustrated the restraint of the two superpowers in the attempts to avoid escalation into a wider war. Despite the Soviets refusal to commit ground troops, Stalin did send in Soviet pilots and planes, albeit disguised as Chinese fighters. United States intelligence was well aware of this fact and in 1992 Paul Nitze contended the reason why it was not made public knowledge was to prevent the escalation of the conflict: “the last thing we wanted was the war to spread to a more serious confrontation with the Soviets.”[14] American atomic diplomacy in the Korean War can be seen as symbolic of future developments in the Cold War. As has already been mentioned, the Soviets had successfully tested their first atomic bomb prior to the North Korean invasion. Yet on 30 November 1950 at a press conference President Truman made it clear that the use of atomic weapons had not been ruled out.[15] This was an attempt to prevent further offensive action by the Communists and implied that the United States knew that it had superior resources at that stage. It also illustrated the feeling of insecurity the United States felt in relation to huge Soviet and Chinese armies.
The impact of the Korean War on Korea itself can still be seen today as the North and South, communist and capitalist, divide remains in effect. In the immediate sense, over ten percent of the population of Korea as a whole was killed, wounded or missing as a result of the war and the physical destruction was astronomical both to industry and agriculture.[16] The eventual development of democratic institutions in South Korea and the economic boom that occurred served as an example of Western superiority, yet this was largely dependent on a constant American influence and presence. In North Korea the economy worsened as communism collapsed in the Soviet Union, and appalling human rights abuses characterised both the aftermath of the war and the present situation. In many respects Korea was the biggest loser of the Korean War as the impact of Cold War dictated the future of the peninsula following World War Two and ultimately prevented the unification of the country.
The Soviet Union both benefited and suffered from the Korean War and its outcome. While Stalin was reassured by Mao’s loyalty and the Soviet’s overall superiority in the Soviet-Sino alliance, the Korean War had both intensified and militarised the Cold War. North Korea remained communist, however in order to ensure this Stalin had to spend hundreds of million of dollars in both economic and military assistance to China and North Korea and had ultimately provoked a “greatly intensified arms race with the Americans.”[17]
The United States did not emerge as a clear victor either. While the policy of “containment” had proved effective, the United States found itself committed to the Cold War on a global scale. The statement made by Truman declaring the United States involvement in the Korean War was indicative of this, Truman stated: “I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack upon Formosa.”[18] This development was particularly detrimental to Mao’s China as he was forced to forego any attempts to destroy Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist opposition on the island of Taiwan. Additionally, the United States had been unable to unite Korea, and had been forced to retreat by communist forces after the United Nation forces crossed the 38th parallel. With regards to combatants, the Korean War served to strengthen alliances on either side, i.e. the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China, as well as the United States and NATO. Ultimately however, the Korean War served to further polarise the two superpowers and their respective spheres of influence, thus widening the Cold War.

[1] W. Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History, (Princeton University Press: Princeton), 2002, p. 12.
[2] Ibid, p. 71.
[3] Ibid, p. 70.
[4] E. H. Judge & J. W. Langdon, The Cold War History: A History Through Documents, (Prentice Hall: New Jersey), 199, p. 58.
[5] Ibid, p. 64.
[6] Ibid, p. 64.
[7] www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/05documents/cia/ accessed 10/27/05.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] M. Walker, The Cold War: A History, (Henry Holt & co.: New York), 1994, pp. 78-9.
[11] S. H. Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the origins of the Cold War in Asia 1949-1954, (McGill-Queens University Press: Montreal), 1995, p. 77.
[12] C. Jian, Mao’s China & The Cold War, (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill), 2001, pp. 88-9.
[13] W. Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, pp.104-5.
[14] M. Walker, The Cold War, pp. 76-77.
[15] W. Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, p.117.
[16] Ibid, p. 1.
[17] W. Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, p.180.
[18] E. H. Judge & J. W. Langdon, The Cold War History, p. 70.

Three Months-Frustrations and Reflections

I have been in the Republic of Korea for three months now, and as with any new experience there have been both good and bad times. This will no doubt continue for the rest of my time here and for the rest of my life. Aside from living in a happy little bubble with no access to news of the outside world and with no attachments to other people, there’s not sure fire way to stop the bad things from happening. There has also been a lot of monsoon rain lately, but I can’t control that either. I guess it’s just how you deal with bad experiences and trying not to let them overshadow the good times. Oh, and investing in a sturdy umbrella.

This week has seen a lot of frustration, from my schedule changes and new status as a glorified tape recording to my apartment falling apart around me, with my boiler breaking down for the third time since I have been here and construction work requiring a 7.30am wake up. I have been reminding myself that this is such a great opportunity and I will probably never get the chance to experience something like this again. Yet it’s hard not to get disheartened when so many things are seemingly going wrong. One of my former students, Jack, was knocked off his bike this week and hospitalised, thankfully he’s going to be ok. I guess it’s just been a shocking and difficult week.

Apparently my schedule will stay the same for the next month, so I will continue reading out of a book and finishing early, the latter is, of course, a bonus. It’s strange though that I have been hired as a foreign language teacher and I am not being used as one. Plus, because I have next to nothing to do at work, having to go back to a crappy apartment just compounds my frustrations.

Yet, there have been good things this week; I have made some great new friends, I teach Grade One on my own again, and I have learnt some new Korean phrases. I know I just need to remind myself that the good outweighs the bad, and I am incredibly lucky to be experiencing Korean culture. I have only seen a fraction of Korea-Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Daecheon, Asan Folk Village and of course Hongseong. There is so much more to do and see, and hopefully I will continue to explore this beautiful, fascinating, and at times confusing (especially the street signs) nation and even though I might not have a hot shower to come back to, at least I have an umbrella.